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When analytic philosophers in the tradition of Carnap and Quine recommended the use
of modern logic—the father of which was Gottlob Frege—then, they did so on the
basis of the conviction that the use of logic in its modern form would increase the
clarity and the stringency of philosophical argumentation. I happen to share this
conviction, which is old-fashioned these days. I am not shaken in this conviction by a
book like Brenner’s, which is called Logic in Reality, but contains hardly anything that
is stringent and hardly anything which is clear—and little where a reader like me feels
that he is making contact with reality. For the badness of the book is not the result of a
use of logic. In Brenner’s eyes, “[t]he real world is only possible because it is
conditionally logically contradictory, that is, partly inconsistent” (p. 134). Well, if that is
the case and partial inconsistency is a necessary condition of reality, even of possibility,
then it must be a methodological rule to be partly inconsistent in the description of
reality. And, indeed, the author seems to have abided by this rule. On page 1, we read:
“Deductive reasoning per se was disconnected [in classical logic] both from processes
of scientific inference and from ordinary experience.”On page 2, we read: “This form of
logic [classical logic] was and is so successful in practice in describing a wide variety of
phenomena that it has come to be considered as an a priori, corresponding in some way
to the laws of thought and reason.”
The general character of Brenner’s book is this: It is the collection of Brenner’s opi-
nions on practically every subject that is or may be considered important in metaphysics
and epistemology: causation, the mind–body problem, consciousness, quantum theory,
the nature of time and space, laws of nature, cosmology, thermodynamics, teleonomy,
evolution, cybernetics, emergence, biosemiotics, quantum morphogenesis, scientific real-
ism, verificationism, etc. The connection of these opinions to Brenner’s logical system,
LIR, seems to me somewhat tenuous, and in many cases, I do not find perusing Brenner’s
opinions particularly illuminating. Here is a comparatively harmless example: “Based on
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combinatorial analysis only, if the actual world is logically possible it is logically
necessary [does this follow from a combinatorial analysis?]. In this conception [which
conception? the one just described? Let’s proceed on the assumption that the conception
meant is the one described in the previous sentence] its modal status is logically
contingent [non sequitur; what does follow is that the actual world, because logically
possible, is logically necessary], a matter of pure chance [non sequitur again; that
something is logically contingent does not entail that it is a matter of pure chance], a
position ascribed to Hawking, Heisenberg, Einstein, and Dirac [Einstein, as far as I
know, did not believe that the modal status of the actual world is one of pure chance],
among others. In the alternative realist logic I propose, a new definition of logical
necessity and a contradictorial relation between necessity and contingency can be found”
(pp. 76/77) [if the relation between logical necessity and logical contingency is
contradictorial, then nothing is neither logically necessary nor logically contingent;
hence nothing is logically impossible. What is the good in having a logic then?]. I
refrain from giving further examples. But some passages of the book, I am sorry to say,
seem simply delirious to me.
It is the author’s aim to present a logic in reality. The aim is laudable. However, I
do not believe that the author has achieved it. But first, what is Brenner’s reality
logic, LIR, supposed to replace or to improve upon? Classical logic. And what is
classical logic? According to Brenner, the fundamental axioms of classical logic are
the following items (p. 2; the items are presented in the very way in which the author
presents them):
CL1: Identity: A is (is identical with) A (or B): A=A or A=B.
CL2: Non-Contradiction: A is not non-A (not (A and non-A)). Arguments that
lead to contradiction are prima facie false.
CL3: Excluded Middle: there exists no third term T that is at the same time A
and non-A (A or non-A).
But this is no more than a bad caricature of the basics of classical logic. The
comments of the author even suggest that his grasp of classical logic is shaky at best
(nevertheless, he ventures to criticize it). The law of noncontradiction does not say that
arguments that lead to contradiction are “prima facie false”; rather, this law implies that
if a logically correct argument leads to contradiction, then at least one of the premises
of this argument is bound to be false. The law of excluded middle, too, does no say
what Brenner asserts it to say. It says, put in the metalinguistic way, that it cannot be
the case that neither statement A nor statement non-A is true, which, according to the
classical truth rules for the logical constants involved, amounts to “A or non-A” being
logically true (for all statements that can be substituted for “A”; incidentally, the
schemata “A is not non-A” and “not (A and non-A)” surely do not mean the same
thing, contrary to what is suggested by Brenner). Finally, Brenner’s CL1 does very
little indeed by way of a characterization of identity. In order to achieve the classical
characterization of identity (in first-order logic), it is, in the first place, necessary to
replace the schematic letters standing for statements by schematic letters standing for
names; that is, it is necessary to go from A=A (which is syntactic nonsense) to a=a.
In the second place, the so-called Leibniz Principle must be added to CL1: If a=b,
then everything true of b is also true of a.
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Clearly, the above axioms, as stated, are insufficient not only for characterizing “=”,
but also for characterizing “and” and “non”. Other logical constants (as for example
quantifiers—Frege’s epochal logical innovation) are not even mentioned by Brenner
when he states the fundamental axioms of classical logic. Brenner assures us (p. 2):
“All standard logics provide for the addition of additional axioms, and/or for recasting
the indicated axioms [CL1–CL3] in other terms in order to define the logic more
completely.” But this does nothing to dispel the bad impression one is left with at this
point: the impression that the author severely misrepresents modern classical logic,
which is one of the greater achievements of the human spirit. If one wishes to improve
on this achievement, one is surely not on the right track if one treats it with disrespect.
It is true that the bad first impression made by Brenner is to some extent corrected
later on (see pp. 12–19), but only in a very cursory fashion.
For his own system, LIR, Brenner provides six axioms (pp. 4/5; the list is repeated
on p. 113). Here is a sample (in Brenner’s own words):
LIR2: Conditional Contradiction: A and non-A both exist at the same time, but
only in the sense that when A is primarily actual, non-A is primarily potential,
and vice versa, to a reciprocal extent.
Let us apply this to the truth of LIR2. Hence: The truth of LIR2 and the negation
of it: the falsity [non-truth] of LIR2, both exist at the same time, but only in the sense
that, when the truth of LIR2 is primarily actual, the falsity of LIR2 is primarily
potential, and vice versa, to a reciprocal extent. To what extent? Is it that the truth of
LIR2 is to the extent of 95% actual and to the extent of 5% potential, whereas the
falsity of LIR2 is to the extent of 5% actual and to the extent of 95% potential? Or is
it that the truth of LIR2 is to the extent of 51% actual and to the extent of 49%
potential, whereas the falsity of LIR2 is to the extent of 49% actual and to the extent
of 51% potential? Or is it otherwise again? I have no idea, and I do not see how
anybody could have one. However, what cannot be—according to Brenner’s axiom
LIR6—is that the truth of LIR2 is to the extent of 100% actual (and to the extent of
0% potential), which means that its falsity must be actual to some extent that is
greater than 0% (we just do not know to which extent its falsity is actualized). In
other words: If one assumes the truth (the simple truth, the 100% truth) of LIR6,
then one cannot, in reason, assume the truth (the simple truth, the 100% truth) of
LIR2. This leads to two fundamental questions: (1) What, really, is a person doing
when she accepts LIR, but cannot reasonably accept both the truth of LIR6 and the
truth of LIR2? (2) How can LIR be a logic in reality if it cannot even be reasonably
accepted as true (about reality)?
There is, therefore, a problem with regard to the relationship of Brenner’s axioms
among each other: They cannot be true together, in other words: they are inconsistent—
and the normal conclusion to be drawn from this is this: they cannot be a correct
description of reality. But the axioms are also problematic in themselves. According to
LIR6, no process of actualization of any element (item) ever goes to 100%
completeness. Does this imply that it is never 100% correct to say that a child has
been born, that a war has ended, that a book has appeared? LIR6 had better not imply
such things. For if it did imply them, then the falsity of LIR6 would be actual to the
extent of 100% and its truth actual to the extent of 0%. But what is it, then, that LIR6
means (in accordance with its wording, of course) and that does not lead to absurdity?
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Consider, finally, LIR1. According to this principle, “[t]here is no A at a given time
that is identical to A at another time”.1 If this were true, nothing would exist at more
than one moment of time; for if something existed at (at least) two moments of time,
then there would of course be an a at a time that is identical to a at another time. Since
I am sure (and I am certainly not alone in this) that I have existed at more than one
moment of time, I conclude not merely that the falsity of LIR1 is actual to some extent
greater than 0% (this much must already be admitted if one accepts the truth of LIR6),
but that it is false, that is: that its falsity is actual to the extent of 100%.
The reader of this review may feel that what I have to say about Brenner’s book is all
too negative and unsympathetic. To counteract this impression, let me point out that the
book has a very positive and sympathetic review built right into it: the foreword by
LorenzoMagnani. According toMagnani (p. xii), “[t]his excellent and demanding book
opens up the door to a deeply informed attitude in logic and epistemology.” Magnani
remarks humbly (ibid.) that “the book overwhelms the reader with references. Of
course, if the reader is appropriately grounded in the vast literature that Brenner affords
in a bibliography,2 the reference to particulars can be very deeply informative. The rest
of us must rely on the sheer weight of putative examples, still extremely informative
and epistemologically rewarding.” I agree that the book overwhelms the reader with
references; I very much doubt, however, that the “putative examples” are weighty
supportive illustrations of logic in reality if that logic is to be the system LIR (one
reason for this being that LIR cannot be true). Contrary to Magnani, I do not feel
“deeply informed” by the book at all. But my final recommendation is this: Take a
close look at Brenner’s book and arrive at your own opinion about it.
1 “This formulation,” says Brenner (p. 4), “is essentially that of Leibniz.” As far as I remember, Leibniz
believed in substances, and substances are transtemporally self-identical—also for Leibniz.
2 As a matter of fact, the book has no comprehensive bibliography. The references are listed at the end of
each chapter.
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